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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationships between health indicators, institutional variables and income inequality. In the 
economic literature, the impact of income distribution on health status is largely studied. Theoretically, all the 
mechanisms developed in the literature highlight a negative impact of income inequality on health status. However, 
empirical studies find different results and the conclusions are far from a consensus. In this article, we partly propose 
an explanation to these discrepancies on the effect of income distribution on health by introducing institutions quality in 
the debate. More precisely, we assess whether the effect of income inequality on population's health is conditional to 
institutions quality. Our analysis shows that income inequality affects negatively population health and this negative 
effect is mitigated by good institutions. Another interesting result is that income inequality affects higher health status 
in developing countries as compare to others.
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     1.  Introduction 
 
Population health is an important economic concern for many developing countries. It plays a 
crucial role in the development process, since it constitutes a component of investment in 
human capital and workforce is the most abundant production factor in these countries. It 
constitutes also a major preoccupation for the international community, especially when it is 
considered  as  a  public  good.  The  importance  given  to  health  status  could  be  illustrated 
through its relatively high weight among the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 
fact, three out of the eight MDGs concern health preoccupations. It is therefore important to 
know the factors that influence population health in order to undertake suitable economic 
policy.  
Rodgers (1979) is one of the first economists to consider income distribution as a determinant 
of health outcomes. He shows that income inequality influences health status not only in 
developed  countries,  but  also  in  developing  countries,  opening  the  debate  about  the 
association between income distribution and health. Wilkinson (1992) reopens the debate by 
showing  through  eleven  industrialized  countries  that  income  inequality  is  an  essential 
determinant  of  health  status.  All  the  theoretical  mechanisms  through  which  income 
distribution  impacts  health  status  developed  in  the  literature  show  that  an  increase  in 
inequality worsens population health. These mechanisms rely on the absolute and relative 
income hypothesis, psychosocial hypothesis and neo-materialism hypothesis as well. Even 
though the major part of the empirical studies on this topic confirm the negative effect of 
inequality on health, some authors reject this hypothesis and show that high inequality may be 
indifferent to health status or improve it (Pampel et Pellai 1986 ; Mellor et Mylio, 2001, 
Deaton,  2003).  On  the  hand,  some  authors  argue  that  this  discrepancy  could  be  partly 
explained by the income inequality indicator used, as Judge (1995) underlined. Through a 
sample of thirteen OECD countries from 1984 to 1987, he found different results according to 
the  inequality  indicator  used.  But,  this  argument  is  not  plausible,  because  Kawachi  and 
Kennedy (1997) showed with six different inequality measures that the negative effect does 
not depend on the choice of indicator, since all the indicators have negative effect. On the 
other  hand,  some  scholars  think  that  the  negative  effect  observed  is  not  due  to  income 
inequality,  but  to  other  variables  correlated  to  it.  For  Jason  (2004),  the  discrepancies  are 
caused  by  statistical  problems,  such  as  small  sample  size,  choice  of  control  variables  or 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  
In this paper, we partly propose an explanation to this discrepancy on the effect of income 
distribution on health by introducing institutions quality in the debate. More precisely, we 
assess  whether  the  effect  of  income  inequality  on  population  health  is  conditional  to 
institutions quality. Previous studies have not explore this hypothesis despite the emergence 
of  a  large  literature  on  institutions  quality  that  consider  them  as  important  source  of 
development, and the appearance of deep inequalities in poor countries. 
Our econometric results show that income inequality worsens health status, and this impact is 
higher in developing countries as compare to others. Another interesting result is that, good 
institutions mitigate this effect of income distribution on population health. 
The rest of this paper is organized in three sections. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
association between income distribution, health status and institutions quality. In this section 
we explain why and how income inequality affects health before introducing the arguments 
that defend the mitigation role of institutions quality. In section 3, we investigate empirically 
the effects of income distribution on health conditional to institutions quality. The last section 
concludes. 
 
 2.  Literature review 
 
  Income inequality and population health 
 
The relationship between income inequality and population health has been investigated by 
many studies during the past 15 years. Scholars examine how and why income inequality 
affects health theoretically and empirically within and between nations. Theoretically, four 
mechanisms are underlined, through which income inequality can harm population health 
(Mayer & Sarin, 2005). 
The first mechanism is the absolute income hypothesis. In fact, income may be an important 
determinant of population health, since it allows them to buy better nutrition or medical care 
or reduces their stress. If the relationship between an individual income level and its health 
status is linear, an extra unit of income will have the same effect on health regardless of 
whether it goes to the rich or to the poor. In this case taking a unit of income from the rich and 
giving it to the poor will lower health status among the rich and raise it among the poor by 
exactly  equal  amounts,  leaving  the  global  health  unchanged.  The  reality  is  that  standard 
economic models predict that the health gains from an extra unit of income should diminish as 
income rises (Preston, 1975; Laporte, 2002; Deaton, 2003; Backlund et al., 1996), in other 
words, health should be a concave function of income. That is, a transfer of a unit of income 
from the rich to the poor might improve aggregate population health status. 
The second mechanism  developed in the literature is the relative income hypothesis. The 
effect of economic inequality is likely to depend to some extent on the geographic proximity 
of  the  rich  to  the  poor  (Mayer  &  Sarin,  2005).  In  fact,  if  people  assess  their  income  by 
comparing themselves to their neighbours, the income of others can affect their health. The 
chronic stress provoked by this comparison may lower resistance to some diseases and cause 
premature death. For Wilkinson (1997), if individuals evaluate their well-being by comparing 
themselves to others with more income than themselves, increases in economic inequality will 
engender low control, insecurity, and loss of self esteem. 
The  third  way  developed  in  the  literature  through  which  income  inequality  may  worsen 
population  health  is  psychosocial  hypothesis.  Inequality  can  impact  health  through  social 
comparisons  by  reducing  social  capital,  trust  and  efficacy  (Kawachi  &  Kennedy,  1997; 
Marmot & Bobak, 2000). According to Wilkinson (1996), income inequality worsens health 
because ranking low in the social hierarchy produces negative emotions such as shame and 
distrust  that  lead  to  worse  health  via  neuro-endocrine  mechanisms  and  stress-induced 
behaviors  such  as  smoking,  excessive  drinking,  taking  dangerous  drugs,  and  other  risky 
activities (Mayer & Sarin, 2005). Lynch et al. (2001) found weak associations between a 
variety of measures of the psychosocial environment, (distrust, belonging to organizations, 
volunteering, and efficacy), and infant mortality, but they found that economic inequality is 
strongly related to infant deaths.  
Neo-materialism hypothesis is the fourth mechanism through which income inequality may 
harm health status. According to some authors defending this idea, income inequality affects 
health  mainly  through  its  effect  on  the  level  and  the  distribution  of  material  resources 
(Coburn,  2000  and  Lynch,  2000).  This  argument  suggests  that  bad  health  could  be  the 
consequence of an increase in income inequality that reduces state spending on medical care, 
goods and services for the poor. 
If theoretically, all the arguments found in the literature indicate a negative impact of income 
inequality on health status, empirical findings are far from a consensus. Lynch et al. (2004) 
review  98  aggregate  and  multilevel  studies  to  examine  the  associations  between  income 
inequality and health. They conclude that overall, there seems to be little support for the idea 
that income inequality is a major, generalizable determinant of population health differences within or between rich countries. Income inequality may, however, directly influence some 
health outcomes, such as homicide in some contexts. Mayer & Sarin (2005) review ten (10) 
studies that use cross-sectional data to estimates the association between economic inequality 
and infant mortality. Eight (8) of these ten use cross-national data and produce eleven (11) 
estimates. Nine (9) of these find that more unequal countries have higher infant mortality 
rates, and two (2) (Pampel & Pellai, 1986; Mellor& Milyo, 2001) find that more unequal 
countries have lower infant mortality rates than countries with less inequality. Wilkinson & 
Pickett (2006) compiled one hundred sixty eight (168) analyses in one hundred fifty five 
(155) papers reporting research findings on the association between income distribution and 
population  health,  and  classified  them  according  to  how  far  their  findings  supported  the 
hypothesis that greater income differences are associated with lower standards of population 
health.  They  find  that  for  eighty  seven  (87)  of  these  studies  the  coefficient  of  income 
inequality  is  always  statistically  significant  with  the  correct  sign.  Forty  four  (44)  present 
mixed results and thirty seven (37) no significant coefficient. They explain the divergence of 
empirical  finding  by  the  size  of  area,  choice  of  control  variables  and  don’t  find  any 
explanation for some international studies.  
In  this  paper  we  explore  whether  the  effect  of  income  inequality  on  population  health  is 
conditional  to  institutions  quality.  This  hypothesis  is  supported  by  some  theoretical 
arguments. 
 
  Role of institutions quality 
 
Many studies investigate the links between institutions quality and social sectors (Baum et al. 
2003), and they normally underline a positive contribution of good institutions quality to these 
sectors in general and particularly to health status. However, the role played by institutions in 
presence  of  income  inequality  remains  unexplored  to  our  knowledge.  Three  categories  of 
theoretical arguments support the importance of institutions quality in the explanation of the 
effect of income distribution on health. 
 
Individual income and investment in public goods:  
The  negative  effect  of  income  inequality  on  health  can  be  reduced  in  presence  of  good 
institutions through redistributive policies. In fact, in all society there are individuals with 
heterogeneous preferences and the best way to take suitable decisions is through law. In a 
democracy, with decisions taken from a majority voting system, the political arena will set the 
social policy at the level that captures the majority’s support to its economic plan. According 
to the median voter theorem, the policy chosen is that of the median  voter (Persson and 
Tabellini 1992, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; and Chang 1998). In a society with high 
income inequality, the median voter belongs to the poorest population with bad health status. 
Therefore, he will choose a redistributive policy more interesting for the poor than the rich. In 
addition, a large amount of the transfer will be used as investment in social infrastructures, 
such as hospital and schooling, important for population health.  
In societies with bad institutions, the policy chosen will reflect the preferences of the dictator 
or a small group of leaders or a group of lobbying (Meltzer and Richard 1981, and Roberts 
1977) and will not take into account the preoccupations of the poor. Such policy will worsen 
poor living conditions and their health status. 
 
The channel of the socio-political unrest: 
Income inequality is negative for population health partly because it constitutes a potential 
factor  of  dissatisfactions  and  frustrations  in  presence  of  bad  institutions.  And  this  could 
provoke  socio-political  unrest,  civil  war,  revolution  and  more  generally  a  climate  of uncertainty. It is the case for some developing countries. This socio-political unrest is costly 
in terms of human capital, namely education, malnutrition, health, etc. Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) show empirically through a study of 71 countries from 1960 to 1985 that in presence 
of bad political institutions, income inequality constitutes a major source of socio-political 
unrest. 
 
The fear of the rich and the short term behaviour of the poor: 
Increasing income inequality in presence of bad institutions constitutes a source of fear for the 
population in general and the rich in particular against the behaviour of the poor (Piven and 
Cloward 1993; Gurr 1970). This is partly due to the cohabitation of rich who obtained their 
wealth from corruption with poor without any hope for the future. This fear could provoke 
stress and worsen population health.  
In addition to this fear, the young without any hope for the future will expose themselves to 
some  risky  and  bad  behaviour  such  as  tobacco,  drug  and  alcohol  consumption  and  risky 
sexual behaviour (Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg, 2005). These behaviours are bad for 
their health in the long term and could be avoid with good institutions.   
 
3.  Empirical analysis 
 
  Data and variables 
 
The data used in this paper cover the period 1975-2000 subdivided into 5 periods of 5 years 
and we retain for the basic regression 91 developed and developing countries (according to 
the availability). As health variables we use the logit of infant mortality rate and the logit of 
under five mortality rate. The mortality indicators are limited asymptotically, and an increase 
in these indicators do not represent the same performance when their initial levels are weak or 
high, the best functional form to examine is that where the variable are expressed as a logit, as 
Grigoriou (2005) underlined. 





. We take the data from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).  
Income inequality is measured by the gini coefficient taken from the database created by 
Galbraith and associates and known as the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) 
database. It contains two different types of data on inequality: the UTIP-UNIDO and the EHII 
indexes.  The  EHII  (that  we  use  here)  is  an  index  (ranging  from  0  to  1)  of  Estimated 
Household Income Inequality and is built combining the information in the Deninger and 
Squire (D&S) data with the information in the UTIP-UNIDO data.  
We also use for the robustness of our results, gini coefficients from the World Institute for 
Development  Economics  Research  of  the  United  Nations  University  (UNU-WIDER)  and 
Milanovic (GINIALL). These data are available at the World Bank web site.  
Three indicators are used to represent institutions variable. The first, investment profile, is 
taken from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the two others (political liberties 
and civil rights) are taken from Freedom House dataset. Investment profile is an assessment of 
factors  affecting  the  risk  to  investment.  The  risk  rating  assigned  is  the  sum  of  three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. 
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. The 
subcomponents are Contract Viability and Expropriation, Profits Repatriation and Payment 
Delays. 
 Freedom House has since 1973 published the Comparative Survey of Freedom, which rates 
the level of democracy or freedom in all independent states and some disputed and dependent 
territories. The survey measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights 
and civil liberties. The methodology of the survey is grounded in basic standards of political 
rights and civil liberties, derived in large measure from relevant portions of the Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  These  standards  apply  to  all  countries  and  territories, 
irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic 
development. The survey operates from the assumption that freedom for all peoples is best 
achieved in liberal democratic societies. The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 
political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are 
grouped  into  three  subcategories:  Electoral  Process  (3  questions),  Political  Pluralism  and 
Participation  (4),  and  Functioning  of  Government  (3).  The  civil  liberties  questions  are 
grouped  into  four  subcategories:  Freedom  of  Expression  and  Belief  (4  questions), 
Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (4). 
 
The  other  explanatory  variables  used  are  gross  domestic  product  per  capita  (GDPCAP), 
population density (POPDENS), fertility rate (FERTILITY), physicians for 1000 habitants 
(PHYSICIAN), all taken from WDI 2007 and unschooled population (UNSCHOOL) from 
Barro and Lee (2000). 
Appendix 1 summarizes the characteristics of the important variables. This table shows the 
mean, the minimum, the maximum, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of 
each variable.  
 
  Estimations 
 
The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the effect of income inequality on health 
depends on the quality of institutions. To achieve this objective, we first examine the impact 
of income inequality on health through the following equation: 
 
   it i it kit k it Health EHII X λ β δ ε = + + +             (3.1) 
 
Where  health  and  EHII  represent  respectively  the  logit  of  health  indicator  and  income 
inequality measure.  k X  is the matrix of the control variables. The country fixed effects are 
represented by  i λ  and  it ε  is the error term. 
Then, we add the interactive term of income inequality and development level variable to 
assess whether the effect is different from developing to developed countries and we obtain: 
 
( ) ( _ ) it i it it it it i kit it it Health EHII EHII dev level X η γ κ θ ω = + + × + +       (3.2) 
 
Where dev_level  is the development level dummy.  i η  represents the country fixed effects and 
it ω   is  the  error  term.  In  this  equation  the  marginal  effect  of  income  inequality  is: 
( ) ( ) it it it it Health EHII γ κ ∂ ∂ = +   for developing countries and  ( ) ( ) it it it Health EHII γ ∂ ∂ =  for 
others. 
Finally, we add the interactive term of income inequality and institutions quality variable to 
evaluate  whether  the  effect  of  income  distribution  is  conditional  to  the  quality  of  the 
institutions and we have: 
 ( ) ( ) it i it it it it kit it it Health EHII EHII institution X φ ψ ρ σ τ = + + × + +       (3.3) 
 
Institution represents the institutions quality variables.  i φ  represents the country fixed effects 
and  it τ   is  the  error  term.  The  marginal  effect  of  income  inequality  becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it Health EHII institution ψ ρ ∂ ∂ = +  
These equations could be estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), but it is very likely 
that population health affects income inequality through productivity, education and other 
factors. This potential simultaneity can be a source of endogeneity. To solve for this problem, 
we estimate them with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM system) since we have 
not any external instrumental variable for income inequality indicator. We use the System-
GMM  estimator  which  combines  equation  in  level  and  equation  in  difference  and  then 
exploits  additional  moment  conditions  (Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  Predetermined  and 
endogenous variables are instrumented by both their lagged values in level and lagged values 
in difference.
1 Two specification tests check the validity of the instruments. The first is the 
standard Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines the 
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals. 
 
  Results 
 
The results obtained from equation (3.1) are presented in table 1 column (1) when the logit of 
infant  mortality  rate  is  used  as  dependent  variable  and  investment  profile  as  institutions 
quality.  This  column  shows  that  income  inequality  worsens  population  health,  since  its 
coefficient is positive and highly significant. All the other explanatory variables have the 
corrected  signs.  GDP  per  capita,  the  number  of  physicians,  the  population  density,  the 
immunization  rate  and  the  institutions  quality  reduce  infant  mortality  rate,  while  the 
unschooled population and the fertility increase it.   
In  the  second  column  of  this  table  are  summarized  the  results  from  equation  (3.2).  This 
equation  adds  the  interaction  term  between  income  inequality  and  development  level  as 
additional  variable  to  equation  (3.1).  This  interaction  term  presents  a  positive  and  highly 
significant coefficient, showing that the effect of income inequality on health is higher in 
developing  countries.  This  is  important  for  our  analysis,  since  these  countries  are 
characterized by their bad institutions quality.  
The third column of this table presents the results when we adds the interaction term between 
income inequality and institutions quality variable as additional variable to equation (3.1), 
namely equation (3.3). The income distribution variable remains positive while the coefficient 
associated to the interaction term is negative and highly significant. This demonstrates that 
income inequality is bad for health, but good institutions mitigate its effect. The introduction 
of this interaction term changes the sign of institutions quality variable’s coefficient. This 
does not mean that good institutions are bad for health, since this bad effect is compensated 
by the negative coefficient of the interaction term between income inequality and institutions 
quality variable.  
The  other  columns  of  this  table  (columns  4,  5,  6  and  7)  show  the  results  when  political 
liberties  and  civil  rights  are  used  as  institutions  quality  variables.  The  results  remain 
unchanged as compare to columns (1 and 3), namely, increases income inequality increase 
infant death, but this effect is reduced by good institutions. 
 
                                                 
1 The paper uses the two-step System-GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample 
bias. To verify the robustness of our result, we first replace infant mortality rate by under five 
mortality  rate.  The  results  obtained  are  presented  in  appendix  3.  These  results  remain 
unchanged as compare to previous results. Then, we use inequality variable from other data 
source, WIDER and Milanovic. The results are summarized in appendix 4 and appendix 5. 
They remain similar to those already obtained. 
 
 
Table 1: Conditional effect of income inequality on infant mortality rate 
Independent variables 
GMM SYSTEM ESTIMATIONS (dependent variable: logit of infant mortality 
rate) 
INSTITUTIONS QUALITY VARIABLES 
ICRG Investment profil    Political    Civil 
(1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)    (6)  (7) 
                   
LGDPCAP  -0.598***  -0.312***  -0.745***    -0.558***  -0.529***    -0.559***  -0.551*** 
  (-8.934)  (-3.846)  (-5.856)    (-7.537)  (-7.233)    (-7.629)  (-7.695) 
PHYSICIAN  -0.0991**  -0.0830**  -0.113    -0.164***  -0.150***    -0.161***  -0.149*** 
  (-2.254)  (-2.286)  (-1.358)    (-3.175)  (-2.993)    (-3.196)  (-3.007) 
POPDENS  -0.0651**  -0.0476***  -0.0894    -0.101***  -0.107***    -0.104***  -0.106*** 
  (-2.457)  (-3.013)  (-1.009)    (-3.264)  (-3.552)    (-3.303)  (-3.445) 
IMMUNIZATION  -0.506***  -0.542***  -0.338*    -0.432***  -0.429***    -0.438***  -0.413*** 
  (-3.357)  (-3.928)  (-1.699)    (-3.252)  (-3.345)    (-3.285)  (-3.188) 
UNSCHOOLING  0.803***  1.117***  0.648    0.619**  0.768***    0.625**  0.749*** 
  (3.085)  (4.325)  (1.038)    (2.184)  (2.739)    (2.210)  (2.635) 
FERTILITY  0.00267  0.0331  -0.0588    0.0288  0.0252    0.0241  0.0250 
  (0.0714)  (0.962)  (-0.696)    (0.734)  (0.660)    (0.616)  (0.655) 
EHII  1.565***  0.824  11.89**    1.029*  3.153***    0.991*  2.938** 
  (3.067)  (1.314)  (2.149)    (1.773)  (2.927)    (1.706)  (2.376) 
(DEV_LEVEL)x(EHII)    1.344***               
    (5.023)               
(INSTITUTION)x(EHII)      -1.508**      -0.697***      -0.639** 
      (-2.008)      (-2.807)      (-2.141) 
INSTITUTION  -0.0312*  -0.0226  0.594*    0.00339  0.300***    0.0109  0.270** 
  (-1.907)  (-1.475)  (1.935)    (0.190)  (2.818)    (0.475)  (2.211) 
CONSTANT  1.643**  -1.243  -1.169    1.451*  0.314    1.478*  0.601 
   (2.323)  (-1.505)  (-0.416)    (1.853)  (0.343)    (1.903)  (0.651) 
Observations  265  265  265    328  328    328  328 
NB. Countries  81  81  81    91  91    91  91 
Hansen OID (p. value)  0.21  0.20  0.76    0.23  0.26    0.19  0.20 
AR(2)  0.64  0.40  0.41    0.43  0.42    0.34  0.33 




4.  Conclusion 
 
The object of this article was to assess the impact of income distribution on population and 
evaluate  whether  this  effect  depends  on  institutions  quality.  Theoretically,  we  show  that 
income  inequality  worsens  population  health  through  many  mechanisms  found  in  the 
literature. We also argue how good institutions could reduce this health degradation.  Empirically,  we  show  through  an  econometric  analysis  that  income  inequality  affects 
negatively population health. This negative effect of income inequality on health status is 
mitigated by  good institutions. Another interesting result is that income inequality affects 
higher health status in developing countries as compare to others.  
This  confirms  the  important  role  institutions  quality  to  achieve  MDGs.  These  results  are 
robust to the choice of health, institutions and income inequality variables. 
As policy implication, our results mean that income inequality is bad for health, and countries 
with high income inequality may implement distributive policy in order to avoid its negative 
impact on health. These countries may also improve their institutions quality to reduce this 
negative effect. 
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Appendix 1: descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES  MEAN  MINIMUM  MAXIMUM  Coef. Var.  NB. Obs. 
IMR  46.768  3.48  191  0.868  536 
U5MR  69.072  4.18  303.64  0.974  536 
EHII  0.4124  0.21  0.6424  0.170  558 
GINI WIDER  0.3822  0.16  0.6366  0.260  240 
GINI MILANOVIC  0.3852  0.16  0.6318  0.255  332 
INVEST. PROFIL  6.3398  1.86  10.833  0.284  372 
POLITICAL  3.4998  1  7  0.599  519 
CIVIL  3.6259  1  7  0.504  519 
GDPCAP  8851.1  492.3  42129  0.926  505 
PHYSICIAN  1.2932  0.017  4.341  0.861  480 
POPDENS  310.06  1.296  15326.4  4.318  550 
IMMUNIZATION  0.7181  0.012  0.99  0.350  484 
UNSCHOOLING  0.2762  0  0.925  0.919  417 




Appendix 2: data characteristics and sources 
VARIABLES  CHARACTERISTICS  SOURCES 
IMR  Infant Mortality Rate  UNICEF - WHO 
U5MR  Under Five Mortality Rate  UNICEF - WHO 
EHII  Estimated Household 
Income Inequality 
University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) database 
GINI WIDER  Gini coefficient Wider  WORLD BANK 
GINI MILANOVIC  gini coefficient Milanovic  WORLD BANK 
INVEST. PROFIL  Investment profil institution  ICRG 
POLITICAL  Political Rights institution  Freedom House 
CIVIL  Civil Liberties institution  Freedom House 
GDPCAP  GDP per capita  WDI 2007 
PHYSICIAN  physicians per 1000 
habitants  WDI 2007 
POPDENS  population density  WDI 2007 
IMMUNIZATION  Immunization from DPT  WDI 2007 
UNSCHOOLING  Unschooling population  WDI 2007 





Appendix 3: Conditional effect of income inequality on under five mortality rate 
Independent variables 
GMM SYSTEM ESTIMATIONS (dependent variable: logit of under five 
mortality rate) 
INSTITUTIONS QUALITY VARIABLES 
ICRG Investment profil    Political    Civil 
(1)  (2)  (3)    (4)    (5) 
               
LGDPCAP  -0.667***  -0.497***  -0.848***    -0.584***    -0.606*** 
  (-8.585)  (-4.958)  (-6.542)    (-8.174)    (-8.675) 
PHYSICIAN  -0.103**  -0.0601  -0.0964    -0.137***    -0.136*** 
  (-1.999)  (-1.510)  (-1.131)    (-2.794)    (-2.832) 
POPDENS  -0.0976***  -0.0567***  -0.117    -0.107***    -0.103*** 
  (-3.175)  (-3.422)  (-1.298)    (-3.635)    (-3.435) 
IMMUNIZATION  -0.484***  -0.540***  -0.391*    -0.458***    -0.439*** 
  (-3.132)  (-3.750)  (-1.926)    (-3.666)    (-3.483) 
UNSCHOOLING  1.053***  1.128***  0.572    0.896***    0.889*** 
  (3.571)  (3.846)  (0.898)    (3.274)    (3.209) 
FERTILITY  0.0222  0.0593  -0.0206    0.0805**    0.0813** 
  (0.543)  (1.542)  (-0.239)    (2.164)    (2.187) 
EHII  1.073*  0.499  12.10**    2.259**    2.043* 
  (1.873)  (0.683)  (2.145)    (2.149)    (1.695) 
(DEV_LEVEL)x(EHII)    0.978***           
    (3.237)           
(INSTITUTION)x(EHII)      -1.587**    -0.552**    -0.490* 
      (-2.072)    (-2.276)    (-1.685) 
INSTITUTION  -0.0303*  -0.0241  0.631**    0.231**    0.195 
  (-1.831)  (-1.530)  (2.017)    (2.218)    (1.635) 
CONSTANT  2.736***  0.836  -0.0680    1.259    1.542* 
   (3.395)  (0.820)  (-0.0237)    (1.405)    (1.714) 
Observations  265  265  265    328    328 
NB. Countries  81  81  81    91    91 
Hansen OID (p. value)  0.25  0.14  0.70    0.12    0.13 
AR(2)  0.56  0.37  0.37    0.32    0.32 




















GMM SYSTEM ESTIMATIONS: DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
UNDER FIVE MORTALITY RATE    INFANT MORTALITY RATE 
Investment profil  Political  civil    ICRG Investment profil  Political  civil 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                   
LGDPCAP  -0.441***  -0.428***  -0.409***  -0.184    -0.397***  -0.316***  -0.314***  0.0949 
  (-5.568)  (-6.447)  (-5.927)  (-0.470)    (-4.533)  (-2.723)  (-4.207)  (0.209) 
PHYSICIAN  -0.154**  -0.171**  -0.155**  0.308    -0.173**  -0.131  -0.180***  0.232 
  (-2.258)  (-2.288)  (-2.603)  (1.153)    (-2.297)  (-1.343)  (-2.793)  (0.806) 
POPDENS  -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0002**    -0.0001***  -0.0002***  -0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
  (-3.568)  (-6.474)  (-4.357)  (-2.548)    (-3.620)  (-3.509)  (-4.555)  (-2.993) 
IMMUNIZATION  -0.512***  -0.501***  -0.298*  -1.233    -0.632***  -0.929**  -0.442**  -1.718 
  (-2.739)  (-2.785)  (-1.717)  (-0.836)    (-3.060)  (-2.484)  (-2.349)  (-1.112) 
UNSCHOOLING  0.948***  1.022***  0.888***  3.256*    1.040***  1.679***  0.909***  3.461* 
  (3.211)  (3.465)  (3.628)  (1.778)    (3.188)  (3.343)  (3.433)  (1.783) 
FERTILITY  0.119***  0.111**  0.153***  0.0831    0.0256  0.00593  0.0880**  -0.0115 
  (2.887)  (2.108)  (4.176)  (0.376)    (0.564)  (0.0962)  (2.224)  (-0.0480) 
GINI WIDER  0.854*  3.043**  2.081***  13.68**    0.921*  3.244  2.291***  14.69* 
  (1.960)  (2.219)  (3.145)  (2.066)    (1.913)  (1.323)  (3.199)  (1.944) 
(INSTITUTION) 
x(GINI WIDER)  -0.350*  -0.322*  -2.625*      -0.326  -0.412**  -2.897* 
    (-1.769)  (-1.945)  (-1.755)      (-0.890)  (-2.294)  (-1.688) 
INSTITUTION  -0.0587***  0.0715  0.143**  0.977    -0.0613**  0.0699  0.199***  1.148 
  (-2.739)  (0.940)  (2.105)  (1.581)    (-2.590)  (0.496)  (2.705)  (1.637) 
CONSTANT  0.503  -0.427  -0.912  -7.359    0.203  -1.366  -1.821**  -9.936 
   (0.715)  (-0.533)  (-1.258)  (-1.274)    (0.262)  (-0.888)  (-2.321)  (-1.495) 
Observations  146  146  180  180    146  146  180  180 
NB. Countries  69  69  75  75    69  69  75  75 
Hansen OID 
(p.value)  0.28  0.98  0.33  0.47    0.73  0.92  0.60  0.82 
AR(2)  0.96  0.81  0.42  0.42    0.99  0.72  0.76  0.77 


















Appendix 5: Conditional effect of income inequality on infant health with gini from 
Milanovic dataset. 
  GMM SYSTEM ESTIMATIONS: DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  UNDER FIVE MORTALITY RATE    INFANT MORTALITY RATE 
Independent  ICRG Investment profil  Political  civil   
ICRG Investment 
profil  Political  civil 
 variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                   
LGDPCAP  -0.439***  -0.275  -0.403***  -0.550    -0.487***  -0.557***  -0.504***  -1.024*** 
  (-5.411)  (-1.489)  (-5.936)  (-1.109)    (-6.898)  (-5.966)  (-8.331)  (-2.766) 
PHYSICIAN  -0.115**  -0.0967  -0.116***  -0.0257    -0.105**  -0.0263  -0.0976**  0.104 
  (-2.404)  (-1.219)  (-2.693)  (-0.167)    (-2.513)  (-0.491)  (-2.548)  (0.734) 
POPDENS  -0.0001***  -0.0002***  -0.0002***  -0.0001*    -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -8.17e-05 
  (-4.306)  (-3.270)  (-5.178)  (-1.864)    (-4.489)  (-3.382)  (-4.948)  (-0.971) 
IMMUNIZATION  -0.594***  -0.527**  -0.477***  -0.434***    -0.428***  -0.416  -0.324**  -0.348* 
  (-3.159)  (-2.274)  (-2.693)  (-2.887)    (-2.615)  (-1.200)  (-2.050)  (-1.798) 
UNSCHOOLING  1.090***  2.234**  0.949***  0.903    1.088***  1.206***  0.938***  -0.109 
  (3.404)  (2.226)  (3.833)  (0.567)    (3.911)  (2.633)  (4.246)  (-0.0729) 
FERTILITY  0.0385  -0.0181  0.0762**  0.00913    0.123***  0.141***  0.145***  0.0476 
  (0.888)  (-0.224)  (2.033)  (0.0685)    (3.257)  (2.760)  (4.340)  (0.313) 
GINI WIDER  1.287***  10.58**  2.544***  7.907**    1.066***  5.447**  2.038***  9.336** 
  (3.050)  (2.368)  (4.100)  (2.328)    (2.907)  (2.560)  (3.683)  (2.293) 
(INSTITUTION) 
-1.246**  -0.440***  -1.768**      -0.604**  -0.287*  -2.118** 
x(GINI WIDER) 
    (-2.075)  (-2.604)  (-2.099)      (-2.036)  (-1.907)  (-2.154) 
INSTITUTION  -0.0397**  0.452*  0.203***  0.709**    -0.0407**  0.210*  0.120*  0.791* 
  (-2.153)  (1.904)  (2.849)  (2.051)    (-2.545)  (1.766)  (1.883)  (1.950) 
CONSTANT  0.130  -5.198*  -1.171  -1.844    0.524  -0.901  -0.101  2.049 
   (0.164)  (-1.800)  (-1.539)  (-0.376)    (0.764)  (-0.662)  (-0.148)  (0.504) 
Observations  222  222  257  257    222  222  257  257 
NB. Countries  77  77  83  83    77  77  83  83 
Hansen OID 
(p. value)  0.86  0.88  0.84  0.89    0.13  0.30  0.17  0.71 
AR(2)  0.71  0.71  0.42  0.27    0.71  0.71  0.23  0.21 















Appendix 6: Country list 
country  country  country  country 
Algeria  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Kenya  Rwanda 
Argentina  El Salvador  Korea, Rep.  Senegal 
Australia  Fiji  Kuwait  Singapore 
Austria  Finland  Lesotho  South Africa 
Bahrain  France  Malawi  Spain 
Bangladesh  Gambia, The  Malaysia  Sri Lanka 
Belgium  Germany  Malta  Swaziland 
Benin  Ghana  Mauritius  Sweden 
Bolivia  Greece  Mexico  Syrian Arab Republic 
Botswana  Guatemala  Mozambique  Thailand 
Brazil  Haiti  Nepal  Togo 
Cameroon  Honduras  Netherlands  Trinidad and Tobago 
Canada  Hungary  New Zealand  Tunisia 
Central African Republic Iceland  Nicaragua  Turkey 
Chile  India  Norway  Uganda 
China  Indonesia  Pakistan  United Kingdom 
Colombia  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Panama  United States 
Congo, Rep.  Ireland  Papua New Guinea  Uruguay 
Costa Rica  Israel  Paraguay  Venezuela, RB 
Cyprus  Italy  Peru  Zambia 
Denmark  Jamaica  Philippines  Zimbabwe 
Dominican Republic  Japan  Poland    
Ecuador  Jordan  Portugal    
 
 